Howard's epiphany

A 6000-word letter from the charismatic Noel Pearson was instrumental in changing John Howard's attitude towards Aboriginal affairs

JOHN Howard's enduring problem in Aboriginal policy was that for too long he had no indigenous allies and trust was rarely established between the prime minister and Aboriginal leaders.

During 2007 he had two Aboriginal leaders, Sue Gordon and Noel Pearson, to dinner at the Lodge. Pearson said: ``I was later told he felt it was the best time he had had with indigenous people. It struck me how sad that was, how isolated and removed he had been.''

His department head, Max Moore-Wilton, summarised the dilemma: ``In 1996 you had an indigenous leadership in mourning for the loss of the Labor government. People such as [Patrick Dodson and [Lowitja O'Donoghue were not willing interlocutors with the Howard government. There was a great sense of frustration.''

Howard's office chief, Arthur Sinodinos, put it differently: ``Howard seemed to be saying that black Australia had to accommodate itself to the government and the mainstream, while Aboriginal leaders were saying to Howard, `No, you've got to change'.''

Toward the end, however, Howard formed a decisive relationship with Pearson. ``Pearson had a great influence on him,'' Sinodinos said. ``The shame is that it didn't come sooner.''

Pearson's magnetism gave Howard the confidence to make a big leap. Having once denounced the Howard government as ``racist scum'', Pearson observed the destruction within his own community and pledged to smash the progressive Left's rights paradigm that had governed indigenous policy for 35 years.

Pearson decided that Howard's conservative emphasis on individual responsibility and practical action was the right approach, and he wanted an alliance with Howard. The Labor Party was incredulous.

``I was thinking long-run,'' Pearson said. ``We had to get the conservatives pledged to our cause.'' Pearson, unlike other Aboriginal leaders, set out to persuade Howard. In 2007 he put his ideas first in a face-to-face meeting with Howard and then by letter. It was Pearson who opened Howard's eyes. His first letter of 6000 words was penned on September 17, 2007, and will stand as the most remarkable letter written by an Aboriginal leader to a prime minister.

``I believe that Australia needs your leadership during the next term of government. You are uniquely positioned to secure the following inspirational agenda for the country: to move Australia fundamentally but prudently: 1) from symbolic and practical reconciliation to `recognition of indigenous people with a reconciled, indivisible nation'; 2) from a `repuditional republic' (which is Australia's current default direction) to an `affirmational republic'; 3) from a `welfare state' to an `opportunity state'.

``You have declared you will resign during the next term. You need a narrative for Australia that dispels the notion that the work of your public life is done. It must engage the most knowledgable commentators as well as ordinary people. The electorate must be convinced that your election program, if realised, would represent a major part of your life's achievement.

``The voters must believe that your program lays the best ground for Australia's future, that you will deal with unfinished business that will need to be dealt with by the country -- if not by you then by some future prime minister -- and that you are the only leader who is able to oversee the implementation of this agenda.''

Pearson wanted Howard to defeat Kevin Rudd. He offered encouragement, flattery and political advice.

``You will recall that I spoke to you about my rating of Australia's prime ministers. I asserted that Australia has never had a tier-1 leader. If you formulate a vision -- that will make the electorate think of you as a potential tier-1 prime minister, you can win this election.

``Your aspiration will need to be this ambitious if you are to win. There is much complacency in the electorate about the idea of a Rudd prime ministership but there is too much cynicism or scepticism about you. I do not believe it is possible for the government to inch its way back through a traditional election campaign.''

Presuming an intimacy with Howard, Pearson spoke to him with unusual frankness. He came as a sympathiser who felt Howard could actually help indigenous people and make a difference.

``If there is one issue that defines you as a combative Right over Left warrior, it is indigenous policy. Movement to the centre in this area will therefore be the most impactful. The way to do it is to base the case on your own life story and your own relationship to indigenous Australians, including your feelings about the 1997 reconciliation conference in Melbourne, an event in your prime ministership which you have averred has troubled you. It will be in the personal telling of your story that you will be able to dispel any sense that there is any insincerity in what you are doing. You must bare your soul.

``You did not grow up with black fellas. You did not know any Aboriginal Australians. The important thing about your relative discomfort and lack of relationship is that you share this experience with 90 per cent of non-indigenous Australians.''

Pearson now moved to the crux of his argument. He offered an intellectual foundation for what he believed to be Howard's natural position on reconciliation.

``Indigenous misery will not be resolved with current policies. I believe it is possible and also necessary to reconcile national unity with indigenous peoplehood.

``Almost all sovereign states are shared states. There are 193 states but several thousand distinct peoples. Most countries have significant minorities that are culturally and historically distinct. The universal challenge is: how do states reconcile a united public citizenship and peoplehood?

``As strongly as I believe in national unity, I believe that cultural diversity has to be accommodated for nations to reach their potential. The distinctness, the peoplehood of Australia's indigenous peoples is not a progressive political construct. It is a real social and historical force that needs recognition. Failure to settle this issue will in the long term lead to prolonged social, political, cultural, spiritual and economic losses and problems.

``We need to reconcile the principle of an undifferentiated national citizenship with indigenous people's rights to land, language, culture and identity on the following bases:

* The supremacy of individual choice and human rights ahead of group rights;

* The imperative of all Australians to speak English;

* The imperative of all children to obtain full, mainstream educations so that they can exercise real choice;

* The imperative for land reform to enable economic development whilst preserving communal title.''

For Pearson, this was the basis for a political compact between indigenous and conservative Australians on how to live in harmony. He said these principles highlighted the failure of the recent UN Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. Damning the declaration as ``unworkable and disappointing'', Pearson said its defect was the inability to accept that group rights must be subservient to both national unity and individual freedom, a critique Howard shared. Analysing indigenous identity, Pearson invoked economist Amartya Sen to argue that individuals need to be seen as possessing ``layers of identity''. He said:

``In a reconciled Australia, an indigenous Australian would see herself as an Australian, a citizen of Australia; a member of her clan and indigenous people; a custodian of her traditional culture and language(s) and a member of the Western and British cultural community.''

Here was the Pearson synthesis. It was an ideal, yet who was to assert it was impossible? But Pearson's vision was at odds with a generation of progressive indigenous policies. He urged Howard to action:

``I am talking about constitutional recognition of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people as an indigenous people of the country and a recognition of their right to keep their culture, language, traditions and identity. Only you or a leader very similar to you, can achieve reconciliation.''

Pearson now took this exposition on to a new plateau: ``Australia is built on two foundation stones: one foundation stone is the indigenous heritage and on top of that was laid the British heritage. And these foundation stones still exist. They endure, they should endure for the future.

``Reconciliation and the affirmational republic need to be linked together conceptually as well as politically. I think that reconciliation alone will not be enough for your re-election bid -- you must consider your position to a republic as well. The necessary constitutional amendment requires `Nixon to go to China'. Only a conservative leader can change the constitution by carrying the conservative constituency and delivering the 80-90 per cent strategy that is needed so that the majority of electors in a majority of the states is achieved.

``This is something that cannot be successfully me-toed because the maths won't allow that. Labor cannot prosecute a 51 per cent strategy on constitutional change: only a conservative leader can prosecute a 80-90 per cent strategy that has any chance of success.''

Howard rejected Pearson's republic proposal. Pearson said that Howard told him: ``I can't find this in myself.''

But in a remarkable decision he accepted Pearson's advice on constitutional recognition for the indigenous peoples and pledged a referendum, proof of Pearson's persuasion.

Yet Howard was unable to link the two concepts (the British and indigenous heritage) as Pearson proposed and, as a result, lost the necessary impact. In his Sydney Institute speech four weeks later, Howard tried to follow Pearson's advice to ``bare your soul'', an act contrary to his nature.

In this speech Howard announced a bill within the first 100 days of his fifth term for a reconciliation statement in the preamble of the constitution. He pledged a referendum within 18 months, saying reconciliation could not be a 51-49 or even a 70-30 prospect. He was reading Pearson's script. Admitting the low points in his dialogue with many indigenous leaders, Howard said: ``I fully accept my share of the blame for that.''

But Howard was doomed and his belated reconciliation leap died along with his political career at the 2007 poll. As Pearson said, this progress came only after ``years of lost opportunity''. A leader with prescience would have put the referendum idea at the 2004 election and put the referendum to the people in 2005 as part of a new strategy that involved practical and symbolic reconciliation.

THE SLOW TRAIN TRACKING PROGRESS

* 1962: Aborigines get the right to vote in federal elections.

* 1967: Referendum passed allowing the commonwealth to make laws for all Aborigines and for them to be counted in the census.

* February 1998: Constitutional convention unanimously endorses inclusion of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders in the preamble to the constitution.

* November 6, 1999: Referendum on a republic fails along with the constitutional preamble.

* June 15, 2007: The Little Children are Sacred report spells out the extent of sexual abuse of children in NT communities.

* June 20, 2007: Howard government launches an intervention in the NT aimed at protecting children from further abuse.

* September 17, 2007: Cape York leader Noel Pearson writes remarkable letter to prime minister John Howard.

* September 20, 2007: NT Aboriginal leader Galarrwuy Yunupingu supports the intervention.

* November 24, 2007: Howard government is defeated.

* August 11, 2009: Yunupingu withdraws his support and condemns the federal and NT governments' inability to deliver Aboriginal housing.